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Ehsan Nekouei, Henrik Sandberg, Mikael Skoglund and Karl H. Johansson
Abstract—This paper studies the design of an optimal privacy-
aware estimator of a public random variable based on noisy
measurements which contain private information. The public
random variable carries non-private information, however, its
estimate will be correlated with the private information due
to the estimation process. It is assumed that the estimate of
the public random variable is revealed to an untrusted party.
The objective is to design an estimator for the public random
variable such that the leakage of the private information, via
the estimation process, is kept below a certain level. The privacy
metric is defined as the discrete conditional entropy of the private
random variable, which carries the private information, given
the output of the estimator. A binary loss function is considered
for the estimation of the public random variable. It is shown
that the optimal privacy-aware estimator is the solution of a
(possibly infinite-dimensional) convex optimization problem. We
next study the optimal perfect privacy estimator which ensures
that the estimate of the public random variable is independent of
the private information. A necessary and sufficient condition is
derived which guarantees that an estimator satisfies the perfect
privacy requirement. It is shown that the optimal perfect privacy
estimator is the solution of a linear optimization problem. A
sufficient condition for the existence of the optimal perfect
privacy estimator is derived when the estimator has access to
discretized measurements of sensors.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
Networked systems play major roles in our society by
providing critical services such as intelligent transportation
and the smart grid. The operation of networked systems relies
on the estimation process wherein the objective is to obtain
accurate values of certain variables based on noisy information
collected by a set of sensors. However, the sensors’ measure-
ments not only contain information about the desired variable
but also contain information which might be considered as
private, e.g., information regarding stochastic events or unpre-
dictable disturbances occurring in the sensors’ environment.
Hence, the output of an estimator of the desired variable
may contain private information due to the dependency of
the sensors’ measurements on the private variables. Thus,
revealing the output of an estimator to an untrusted party might
result in the loss of privacy. In what follows, we refer to the
leakage of private information due to the estimation process
as the privacy loss.
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As a motivating example, consider a smart building applica-
tion wherein sensors regularly collect noisy information about
the temperature level in different areas of the building. The
temperature measurement in each area of the building depends
on the number of people, i.e, the occupancy level, in that
area which may be considered as private information. Thus,
revealing an estimate of the temperature to an untrusted party,
for storage or management purposes, might result in the loss
of privacy as the released data contain information regarding
the occupancy level in different areas of the building.
Due to the distributed structure of networked systems,
the output of the estimation process is usually shared with
untrusted parties, e.g., with a cloud-based storage system or
with a cloud-based controller for temperature regulation in a
smart building application. We refer to the untrusted party
with access to the output of the estimator as the “user. Thus,
to ensure the privacy of a networked system, it is important
to design privacy-aware estimators which provide accurate
estimates of the desired variables based on the sensors’
measurements and simultaneously ensure that the leakage of
private information due to the estimation process is kept below
a certain level.
B. Contributions
In this paper, we consider an estimation problem in which
the sensors’ measurements contain noisy information about a
private random variable and a public random variable. It is
assumed that the estimate of the public variable is revealed to
the user. Our objective is to design the optimal randomized
estimator of the public random variable subject to a constraint
on the privacy level of the private random variable. The notion
of conditional discrete entropy is used to quantify the leakage
of the private information due to the estimation procedure.
That is, the conditional discrete entropy of the private random
variable given the output of the estimator is considered as the
privacy metric. The privacy metric captures the uncertainty of
the user regarding the private random variable after observing
the estimate of the public random variable.
We first consider a single sensor estimation problem. It is
shown that the optimal privacy-aware estimator is the solution
of an infinite dimensional convex optimization problem when
the estimator has access to the sensor’s measurement, modeled
as a continuous random variable. When the estimator receives
a discretized version of the sensor’s measurement, the optimal
estimator design problem becomes a finite dimensional convex
optimization problem. Necessary and sufficient optimality
conditions for the optimal estimator are derived in the finite
dimensional problem.
2We also consider the optimal perfect privacy estimator
design problem which ensures that the estimate of the public
random variable is independent of the private random variable.
When the estimator has access to the continuous measure-
ments, we show that the optimal perfect privacy estimator
is the solution of an infinite dimensional linear optimization
problem. It is shown that the feasible set of this optimization
problem is always non-empty. When the estimator operates
based on the discretized sensor’s measurement, the optimal
perfect privacy estimator is the solution of a finite dimensional
linear optimization problem. It is shown that if the dimension
of the null space of a certain matrix is non-zero, the feasible
set of the optimal perfect privacy estimator design problem
is non-empty. We also discuss the extension of the estimator
design problem to a multi-sensor scenario.
C. Related Work
The privacy aspect of hypothesis testing problems with a
private and a public hypothesis has been studied in the liter-
ature, and various privacy-preserving solutions for improving
the privacy level of hypothesis test problems have been pro-
posed, e.g., see [1], [2], [3], [4]. In [5], the authors considered
a hypothesis test problem with multiple sensors in which
an eavesdropper intercepts the local decisions of a subset of
sensors. They studied the optimal decision rule minimizing the
Bayes risk at a fusion center subject to a privacy constraint
at the eavesdropper. In [6], the authors considered a similar
set-up to that of [5] and studied the optimal privacy-aware
Neyman-Pearson test with a private hypothesis. The privacy of
electricity consumers against an eavesdropper using demand
management techniques and storage devices was studied in
[7].
Privacy preserving filters, for the state privacy problem in
a cloud-based control application, were studied in [8] using
the notion of directed information as the privacy metric. The
privacy-aware controller design problem for a private Markov
decision process problem in presence of an eavesdropper, with
access to the input and output of the process, was studied
in [9]. The authors in [10] studied the privacy filter design
problem for a public Markov chain, correlated with a private
Markov chain, when both private and public chains are directly
observable.
The notion of differential privacy has been used to study
the privacy-aware estimation, filtering and average consensus
problems. The authors in [11] proposed a filtering scheme for
preserving the privacy of states or measurements of dynamical
systems using the notion of differential privacy. The state
estimation problem in a distribution power network subject to
differential privacy constraints for the consumers was studied
in [12]. The authors in [13] considered a distributed multi-
agent control problem and proposed a differential privacy
scheme for preserving the privacy of the initial state as well as
the preferred target way-points of each agent. Privacy-aware
average consensus algorithms, for preserving the privacy of
initial states of different agents, have been proposed in [14]
[15].
Information-theoretic methods for improving data privacy
have been investigated in the literature, e.g., see [16], [17],
[18], [19] and references therein. In this line of research, the
objective is to design privacy preserving filters which operate
on a (directly observable) public random variable which is
correlated with a private random variable. The privacy filter is
designed such that the distortion between the public variable
and its processed version is minimized while a certain level
of privacy is guaranteed. The current manuscript is different
from this line of research in that, in our set up, neither the
public nor the private random variables are directly observable,
and the sensors’ observations contain noisy information about
the public and private random variables. Moreover, in an
estimation problem, one is interested in the true value of a
variable based on a noisy observation rather than obtaining a
low distortion representation of a directly observable random
variable.
In [20], the authors considered the problem of adding
stochastic distortion to a public variable, which depends on a
private information, such that (i) the mean square error (MSE)
of recovering the original variable from its distorted version is
minimized, (ii) the minimum MSE of recovering the private
information from the distorted variable stays above a certain
level. Their results were extend in [21] under the Hamming
distance as the distortion criterion and the efficiency of these
methods was analysed in [22].
Perfect privacy filters in the context of data privacy have
been studied in [23]. The results of [23] are mainly derived
based on the assumption that the public random variable is
directly observable and takes finite values. Also, the perfect
privacy condition in [23] requires characterization of the
extreme points of a certain convex polytope which depends on
the null space of a probability transition matrix. Finally, we
note that the relation between the perfect privacy condition and
the notion of maximal correlation has been studied in [24].
Different from the existing work, we consider the problem
of recovering a public random variable from a noisy obser-
vation which depends on both private and public random
variables. That is, in our set-up, the sensor does not have
(direct) access to the private or public random variables. Our
objective is to design an estimator for the public random
variable with a guarantee on the leakage of the private infor-
mation. Our work differs from [23], in that, we assume that
the sensor’s observations take values in R which results in
an infinite-dimensional convex optimization problem. In our
work, the optimal perfect privacy estimator with discretized
measurements is obtained by solving a linear optimization
problem which does not require finding the extreme points
of a convex polytope. Moreover, we study the perfect privacy
condition for both continuous and discretized measurements.
Our results show that the perfect privacy with the discretized
measurements depends on the null space of a matrix with pos-
itive and negative entries which is different from a transition
probability matrix.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Our system
model and assumptions are described in the next section.
Section III presents our results on the optimal privacy-aware
and optimal perfect privacy estimator design problems with
a single sensor. These results are extended to a multi-sensor
3Fig. 1. A single sensor estimation set up.
set-up in Section IV. Our numerical results are preseneted in
Section V, followed by the concluding remarks in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider an estimation problem with one sensor in which
the sensors’ measurement, denoted by Z , contains noisy
information about two, possibly correlated, discrete random
variables X and Y . The random variable Y contains public
information, and upon observing Z , an estimate of Y is
delivered to an untrusted party, hereafter, named the user. The
random variable X carries information which should be kept
hidden from any untrusted party. The support sets of X , Y
and Z are denoted by X = {x1, · · · , xn}, Y = {y1, · · · , ym}
and Z = R, respectively. Through this paper, we assume that
the random variable Z is absolutely continuous with respect to
Lebesgue measure on R with the probability density function
pZ (z). A pictorial representation of our system model is
illustrated in Fig. 1.
Let Yˆ (Z) denote an estimate of Y based on the observation
Z . The user can infer information about the private random
variable X by observing Yˆ (Z) since Yˆ (Z) is usually corre-
lated with X . Thus, revealing Yˆ (Z) to the user may result in
the privacy loss, i.e., the user can infer about X by observing
Yˆ (Z). In what follows, by privacy loss we mean the leakage
of the private information due to the estimation task.
In this paper, our objective is to design an estimator for
the public random variable Y which minimizes a desired
loss function while the information leakage about the pri-
vate variable X is kept below a certain level. An estimator
of Y is a (possibly randomized) map from Z to Y . Let
P (z) = [Pi (z)]
m
i=1 denote a set of positive functions where
m = |Y| and Pi (z) is defined on the support set of Z with∑m
i=1 Pi (z) = 1 for all z ∈ Z . Then, a randomized estimator
of Y can be expressed as
YˆP (z) =


y1 w.p. P1 (z)
...
...
ym w.p. Pm (z)
(3)
where w.p. stands for with probability. According to (3), if the
sensor’s measurement is equal to z, the estimator declares yi
as the estimate of Y with probability Pi (z).
We use a binary loss function, denoted by L
(
Y, YˆP (Z)
)
,
to quantify the estimation loss of the private random variable
which is expressed as
L
(
Y, YˆP (Z)
)
=
{
1 Y 6= YˆP (Z)
0 Y = YˆP (Z)
Thus, the estimation loss is equal to 1 if the output of the
estimator is different from the true value of Y and there is no
loss if these two values agree.
A. Motivating Examples
In this subsection, we provide three motivating examples of
privacy-aware estimation problem which include public and
private random variables.
1) Temperature and CO2 Estimation In A Building: Con-
sider a smart building application in which the objective is
to estimate the temperature and CO2 levels inside a building
based on the noisy measurements of sensors. Here, the random
variable X represents the number of occupants in the building
which is considered as private information, Y represents the
actual temperature and CO2 levels and Z represents noisy
measurements of temperature and CO2 obtained from sensors.
In this application, Y depends on X directly. The objective is
to provide an accurate estimate Y , based on Z , for an untrusted
user, e.g., a cloud-based controller, while the dependency of
Yˆ on X is kept below a certain level.
2) Smart Meter Problem: Consider a smart grid application
wherein the objective is to estimate the number of active smart
appliances in a household based on its electricity consumption
level. In this application, the absence/presence of tenants
can be modeled using the binary random variable X , which
contains private information, Y represents the number of active
smart appliances and Z represents the electricity consumption
level. In this application, an estimate of Yˆ is provided to an
untrusted party, e.g., a utility company. The objective is to
design an estimator of Y such that the leakage of the private
information, after Yˆ is revealed to the untrusted party, is kept
below a certain level.
3) Counting The Vehicles On A Road: Consider the prob-
lem of counting vehicles on a road based on the position esti-
mates of individual vehicles. In this application, X represents
the velocity of a vehicle which is considered as its private
information, Y represents the actual position of the vehicle
and Z denotes the noisy measurement of the position of the
vehicle. The estimates of position by individual vehicles can
used by a traffic operator, i.e., an untrusted party, to estimate
the number of vehicles on the road at a given time. In this
application, the objective is to design an estimator of Y based
on Z for individual vehicles such that leakage information
about each vehicle’s velocity, after revealing its corresponding
position estimate Yˆ to the traffic operator, is kept below a
certain level.
B. Privacy Metric
In this paper, we consider the conditional discrete entropy,
or equivocation, as the privacy metric. The conditional discrete
entropy of X given YˆP (Z), denoted by H
[
X
∣∣∣YˆP (Z)], is
4H
[
X
∣∣∣YˆP (Z)] = −∑
y∈Y
Pr
(
YˆP (Z) = y
)∑
x∈X
Pr
(
X = x| YˆP (Z) = y
)
logPr
(
X = x| YˆP (Z) = y
)
(1)
H
[
X
∣∣∣YˆP (Z)] = H [X ]−∑
j
Pr (X = xj)D
[
p
YˆP
(y |X = xj )
∥∥∥pYˆP (y)
]
(2)
defined in (1). Our choice of privacy metric is motivated by
the fact that H
[
X
∣∣∣YˆP (Z)] captures the ambiguity of the
user about X after observing YˆP (Z). Thus, the privacy loss
decreases as H
[
X
∣∣∣YˆP (Z)] becomes large since the user be-
comes more uncertain about the value of X as H
[
X
∣∣∣YˆP (Z)]
increases. Since conditioning reduces entropy [25], we have
0 ≤ H
[
X
∣∣∣YˆP (Z)] ≤ H [X ]
which implies that the maximum privacy is achieved if
H
[
X
∣∣∣YˆP (Z)] = H [X ]. Recall that if X and YˆP (Z) are
independent, YˆP (Z) contains no information about X and the
user has maximum ambiguity aboutX after observing YˆP (Z),
i.e., H
[
X
∣∣∣YˆP (Z)] = H [X ].
The other motivation for the choice of the privacy metric in
this paper is the fact that the error probability of estimating
X after observing YˆP (Z) can be lower bounded in terms of
H
[
X
∣∣∣YˆP (Z)] using Fano’s inequality [25]:
Pr
(
X 6= Xˆ
(
Yˆ
))
≥
H
[
X
∣∣∣YˆP (Z)]− 1
log |X |
(4)
where Xˆ
(
Yˆ
)
is an arbitrary estimator of X and |X | is the
cardinality of the support set of X . Note that this lower
bound is independent of the estimator of X , i.e., it holds
for all possible estimators. Thus, by adjusting the value of
H
[
X
∣∣∣YˆP (Z)], a desired privacy level of the private random
variable can be guaranteed as long as |X | > 2.
III. PRIVACY-AWARE OPTIMAL ESTIMATION PROBLEM:
SINGLE SENSOR CASE
In this section, the design of the optimal privacy-aware
estimator of the public random variable is studied. We first
study the privacy-aware and the perfect privacy estimator
design problems when the estimator has access to the sensor’s
measurement. We then investigate the estimator design prob-
lems when the discretized sensor’s measurements are available
at the estimator.
A. Optimal Estimator With Continuous Measurements
In this subsection, we assume that the estimator has access
to Z which is a continuous random variable. In this case, the
optimal design of the estimator subject to the privacy con-
straint is given by the solution of the following optimization
problem:
minimize
{Pi(z)}
m
i=1
E
[
L
(
Y, YˆP (Z)
)]
Pi (z) ≥ 0, ∀i∑
i
Pi (z) = 1, ∀z
H
[
X
∣∣∣YˆP (Z)] ≥ H0 (5)
According to this optimization problem, the functions
[Pi (z)]i are chosen such that the average estimation loss is
minimized and, a certain level of privacy is ensured by keeping
the conditional discrete entropy of X given YˆP (Z) above the
desired level H0.
The optimization problem (5) is a functional optimization
problem defined on the space of bounded measurable functions
from R to R, i.e., B (R,R). Note that B (R,R) forms a
Banach space under the supremum norm and Pi (z) belongs
to the cone of positive functions in B (R,R) for all i. Next
lemma derives an expression for the objective function of the
optimization problem (5).
Lemma 1: The objective function in (5) can be written as
1−
∑
i
∫
Pi (z)Pr (Y = yi|Z = z) pZ (z)dz
where pZ (z) is the probability density function of Z and
Pr (Y = yi|Z = z) is the conditional probability of the event
Y = yi given the event Z = z.
Proof: See Appendix A.
According to Lemma 1, the objective function of the op-
timization problem (5) is linear in the decision variables
P (z) = [Pi (z)]i. Next lemma studies the convexity of the
privacy constraint.
Lemma 2: The privacy constraint can be written as (2)
where H [X ] is the discrete entropy of X , p
YˆP
(y) and
p
YˆP
(y |X = xj ) denote the probability mass function of
YˆP (Z) and the conditional probability mass function of
YˆP (Z) given X = xj , respectively, and D [· ‖· ] denotes
Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence (relative entropy). Further-
more, the privacy constraint is convex in P (z).
Proof: See Appendix B.
The objective function in the optimization problem (5) is
linear and the constraint set is convex. Thus, the optimization
problem (5) is a convex optimization problem. This result is
formally stated in the next theorem.
Theorem 1: The optimal privacy-aware estimator of the
public random variable can be designed by solving the convex
5optimization problem (5).
B. Optimal Estimator With Discretized Measurements
In this subsection, we assume that the estimator has only
access to a discretized version of the sensor’s measurement.
This allows us to express the privacy-aware estimator design
problem as a finite dimensional convex optimization problem.
To this end, let {Bi}
N
i=1 denote a partition of R where B1 and
BN are semi-infinite intervals and where Bi, 2 ≤ i ≤ N − 1,
are of the form Bi = [ai−1, ai], ai > ai−1. A randomized
estimator of Y , based on the discretized measurements, is
defined as
YˆP (z) =


y1 w.p. P1l, if z ∈ Bl
...
...
...
ym w.p. Pml, if z ∈ Bl
where
∑
i Pil = 1 for all l ∈ {1, · · · , N}. Thus, the
estimator selects yi as its output with probability Pil if the
sensor’s measurement belongs to Bl. The optimal privacy-
aware estimator, under discretized measurements, is given by
minimize
{Pil}i,l
E
[
L
(
Y, YˆP (Z)
)]
Pil ≥ 0, ∀i, l∑
i
Pil = 1, ∀l
H
[
X
∣∣∣YˆP (Z)] ≥ H0 (6)
In this case, the probability of correct estimation can be
expressed as
Pr
(
Y = YˆP (Z)
)
=
∑
l
Pr
(
Y = YˆP (Z) , Z ∈ Bl
)
=
∑
il
Pr (Y = yi|Z ∈ Bl)Pr (Z ∈ Bl|Y = yi)Pr (Y = yi)
=
∑
il
PilPr (Z ∈ Bl|Y = yi)Pr (Y = yi)
Moreover, p
YˆP
(y) and p
YˆP
(y |X = xj ) can be written as
p
YˆP
(yi) = Pr
(
YˆP (Z) = yi
)
=
∑
l
Pr
(
YˆP (Z) = yi
∣∣∣Z ∈ Bl)Pr (Z ∈ Bl)
=
∑
l
PilPr (Z ∈ Bl) (7)
and
p
YˆP
(yi |X = xj )
= Pr
(
YˆP (Z) = yi
∣∣∣X = xj)
=
∑
l
Pr
(
YˆP (Z) = yi
∣∣∣Z ∈ Bl)Pr (Z ∈ Bl|X = xj)
=
∑
l
PilPr (Z ∈ Bl|X = xj)
Following the proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2, it can be shown
that the optimization problem (6) is a convex optimization
problem.
The next lemma states the KKT necessary and sufficient
optimality conditions for the optimization problem (6).
Lemma 3: Let P ⋆ denote the optimal solution of the
optimization problem (6). Then, we have (8) where µ⋆ is the
dual optimal variable associated with the privacy constraint
and λ⋆ is the vector of dual optimal variables associated with
the equality constraints.
Proof: See Appendix C.
C. Optimal Perfect Privacy Estimator With Discretized Mea-
surements
In this subsection, we first define the perfect privacy con-
dition, and derive a necessary and sufficient condition for an
estimator to satisfy the perfect privacy requirement. Then, we
show that the optimal perfect privacy estimator can be obtained
by solving a linear optimization problem.
Definition 1: An estimator of the public random variable
satisfies the perfect privacy condition if the output of the
estimator is independent of the private random variable.
Before proceeding with the derivation of the perfect privacy
condition, we first define the matrix Φ as
Φ =


φ11 · · · φ1N
...
...
φn1 · · · φnN


where φjl = Pr (Z ∈ Bl|X = xj) − Pr (Z ∈ Bl). Also, the
vector P i is defined as
P i =


Pi1
...
PiN


which is the collection of randomization probabilities asso-
ciated with selecting yi, as the output of an estimator, for
different bins. Next lemma derives a necessary and sufficient
condition for the randomization probabilities which ensure the
prefect privacy for the estimation.
Lemma 4: An estimator satisfies the perfect privacy condi-
tion if and only if P i ∈ Null (Φ) for all i ∈ {1, · · · ,m} where
Null (Φ) is the null space of the matrix Φ defined in (9).
Proof: See Appendix D.
According to this lemma, a randomized estimator satisfies
the perfect privacy condition if the vector of randomization
probabilities associated with each element of Y , i.e., the
support set of the public random variable, lies in the null
space of the matrix Φ. We note that the perfect privacy
conditions have been studied in the literature for different
settings, e.g., see [23] and [26]. For example, the perfect
privacy conditions in [23] require that the dimension of the null
space of certain transition probability matrices to be non-zero.
However, the perfect privacy condition in our paper requires
that the randomization probability vectors P is to lie in the
null space of the matrix Φ which is not a transition probability
matrix.
6µ⋆ log
∏
j
(∑
l P
⋆
hlPr (Z ∈ Bl|X = xj)∑
l P
⋆
hlPr (Z ∈ Bl)
)Pr(Z∈Bk,X=xj)

= Pr (Z ∈ Bk|Y = yh)Pr (Y = yh) + λ
⋆
k if 0 < P
⋆
hk < 1
≤ Pr (Z ∈ Bk|Y = yh)Pr (Y = yh) + λ
⋆
k if P
⋆
hk = 0
≥ Pr (Z ∈ Bk|Y = yh)Pr (Y = yh) + λ
⋆
k if P
⋆
hk = 1∑
h
P ⋆hl = 1 ∀l
µ⋆ ≥ 0
H
[
X
∣∣∣YˆP ⋆ (Z)] ≥ H0
µ⋆
(
H0 − H
[
X
∣∣∣YˆP ⋆ (Z)]) = 0 (8)
We next study the optimal perfect privacy estimator design
problem, i.e., finding the optimal estimator among all the
estimators which satisfy the perfect privacy condition. The
optimal perfect privacy estimator is given by the solution of
minimize
{Pil}i,l
E
[
L
(
Y, YˆP (Z)
)]
Pil ≥ 0, ∀i, l∑
i
Pil = 1, ∀l
ΦP i = 0, ∀i (9)
Note that the perfect privacy condition in the optimization
problem above is linear in the decision variables, i.e., the
randomization probabilities. Thus, the optimal perfect privacy
estimator can be obtained by solving a linear optimization
problem.
Let P = P1×· · ·×PN denote the joint probability simplex
corresponding to the randomization probabilities of bins, i.e.,
for each bin l, l ∈ {1, · · · , N}, we have (P1l, · · · , Pml)
⊤
∈
Pl. The feasible set of the optimization problem above is the
intersection of the set P and the perfect privacy condition.
We next derive a sufficient condition which ensures that the
feasible set of the optimization problem (9) is non-empty.
Lemma 5: If the number of discretization bins, i.e., N , is
more than the size of the support set of the private random
variable X , then the feasible set of (9) is non-empty.
Proof: See Appendix E.
D. Optimal Perfect Privacy Estimator with Continuous Mea-
surements
In this subsection, the perfect privacy condition with con-
tinuous measurements is derived and it is shown that the
optimal perfect privacy estimator is the solution of an infinite
dimensional linear optimization problem.
According to the perfect privacy definition, the output of the
estimator, YˆP (Z), satisfies the perfect privacy requirement if
and only if we have
Pr
(
YˆP (Z) = yi, X = xj
)
= Pr
(
YˆP (Z) = yi
)
Pr (X = xj)
for all i, j. Note that, Pr
(
YˆP (Z) = yi, X = xj
)
and
Pr
(
YˆP (Z) = yi
)
can be written as
Pr
(
YˆP (Z) = yi, X = xj
)
=
∫
Pr
(
YˆP (Z) = yi, X = xj
∣∣∣Z = z) pZ(z)dz
= Pr (X = xj)
∫
Pi (z) pZ (z |X = xj ) dz
and
Pr
(
YˆP (Z) = yi
)
=
∫
Pi (z) pZ (z)dz
Thus, for Pr (X = xj) 6= 0, the perfect privacy condition can
be written as∫
Pi (z) (pZ (z)− pZ (z |X = xj )) dz = 0
Thus, the optimal perfect privacy estimator design problem
with continuous measurements can be written as
minimize
{Pi(z)}
m
i=1
E
[
L
(
Y, YˆP (Z)
)]
Pi (z) ≥ 0, ∀i∑
i
Pi (z) = 1, ∀z∫
Pi (z) (pZ (z)− pZ (z |X = xj )) dz = 0 ∀i, j (10)
Note that perfect privacy constraint in the optimization prob-
lem above is a linear constraint.
We next show that the feasible set of the optimal perfect
privacy estimation problem, in the continuous case, is always
non-empty.
Lemma 6: The feasible set of the optimal perfect privacy
estimator design problem with continuous measurements in
(10) is always non-empty.
Proof: See Appendix F.
IV. EXTENSION TO MULTI-SENSOR CASE WITH DISCRETE
MEASUREMENTS
In this section, we extend the privacy-aware and perfect
privacy estimation problems to a multi-sensor scenario. To
this end, consider a multi-sensor estimation problem with M
sensors. Let Zs, s ∈ {1, · · · ,M}, denote the measurement of
sensor s which depends on the private random variable X and
the public random variable Y . We assume that the sequence of
7random variables {Zs}s are conditionally independent given
X and Y , i.e., the joint distribution of {Zs}s given X and
Y is equal to the product of the conditional distributions of
the sensors’ measurements given X and Y . We only focus on
the optimal estimator design with discretized measurements.
These results can be easily extended to the continuous mea-
surements case.
In the multi-sensor case, each sensor s transmits the index
of the bin, corresponding to the realization of its measurement
Zs, to a (common) remote estimator. Fig. 2 illustrates the
multi-sensor estimation set-up. Let Z˜s denote the information
transmitted to the estimator by sensor s. Then, we have
Z˜s = l if Zs ∈ Bl and the random variable Z˜s takes
values in {1, · · · , N} for all s where N is the number of
bins. The estimator computes an estimate of Y , based on
the received information from sensors, subject to the privacy
constraint. More precisely, the estimator first forms the vector
C = (C1, · · · , CN ) according to Cl =
∑
i 1{Z˜i=l} for
l ∈ {1, · · · , N} where Cl denotes the number of sensors
which transmit l as their bin indicies to the remote estima-
tor. Note that the random vector C takes values in C ={
(c1, · · · , cN ) ∈ N
N
0 ,
∑
l cl = M
}
where N0 is the set of non-
negative integers. In what follows, we use c = (c1, · · · , cN) ∈
C to represent a realization of C.
Given C = c, the output of a randomized estimator of Y
can be expressed as
YˆP (c) =


y1 w.p. P1c,
...
...
ym w.p. Pmc,
where Pic ≥ 0 and
∑
i Pic = 1. That is, the estimator selects
yi as the estimate of Y with probability Pic. Under the binary
loss function defined in Section II, the objective function of
the estimation problem can be written as
1− Pr
(
Y = Yˆ (C)
)
= 1−
∑
i,c
PicPr (C = c|Y = yi)
which is linear in the decision variables {Pic}ic. Thus, the
optimal privacy-aware estimator design problem can be written
as
minimize
{Pic}i,c
1−
∑
i,c
PicPr (C = c|Y = yi)
Pic ≥ 0, ∀i, c ∈ C∑
i
Pic = 1, ∀c ∈ C
H
[
X
∣∣∣YˆP (C)] ≥ H0
Following the proof of Lemma 2, it is straightforward to show
that the privacy constraint in the optimization problem above is
a convex constraint. Thus, the optimal privacy-aware estimator
design problem is a convex optimization problem. Moreover,
the optimal perfect privacy estimator in the multi-sensor case
be obtain by solving the following optimization problem
minimize
{Pic}i,c
1−
∑
i,c
PicPr (C = c|Y = yi)
Pic ≥ 0, ∀i, c ∈ C∑
i
Pic = 1, ∀c ∈ C
∑
c
Pic (Pr (C = c|X = xj)− Pr (C = c)) = 0, ∀j, i
Following similar steps as those in the proof of Lemma 5,
one can show that the feasible set of the above optimization
problem is non-empty if |C| > n.
Finally, we derive an expression for the objective function
of the estimator design problem when the sensors’ measure-
ments, i.e., Zss, are identically distributed. Note that we
have Pr (C = c|Y = yi) =
∑
j Pr (C = c|Y = yi, X = xj).
Moreover, using the fact that the sensors’ measurements are
conditionally independent given X and Y , we have
Pr (C = c|Y = yi, X = xj)
=
M !
c1! · · · cN !
∏
l
Pr (Zs ∈ Bl|Y = yi, X = xj)
cl
for identically distributed measurements.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we consider a multi-sensor estimation prob-
lem with M sensors. It is assumed that the measurement
of sensor s is given by Zs = 0.6Y + 0.4X + Ns where
X,Y ∈ {0, 1}, Pr (X = 0) = 0.7, Pr (Y = 0) = 0.5, and
Ns is a zero mean Gaussian random variable with variance
equal to 0.01. The random variable 0.4X +Ns represents the
measurement noise of sensor s. Thus, when the value of X
changes from 0 to 1, the mean of measurement noise changes
from 0 to 0.4. We assume that the change in the mean of
the measurement noise is triggered by an external stimulant,
e.g., a change in the temperature, affects all the sensors
simultaneously and it should be kept private. The sequence
of random variables {Ns}s is assumed to be independent and
identically distributed. In our numerical results, the number of
discretization bins is equal to 4 for all sensors.
We compare the performance of the optimal perfect privacy
estimator with that of a privacy-oblivious estimation scenario.
In the privacy-oblivious scenario, each sensor individually
estimates Y (with no privacy constraint) and the user receives
the estimates of Y from sensors. Let Yˆ pos denote the optimal
estimate of Y by sensor s based on its local measurement Zs
with no privacy constraint. Then, under the privacy oblivious
scenario, the user can estimate both X and Y using the
received local estimates of sensors, i.e.,
{
Yˆ pos
}
s
. Fig. 3 shows
the error probability of estimating X using
{
Yˆ pos
}
s
as a
function of the number of sensors. As this figure shows,
the ambiguity of the user regarding the private variable X
decreases as the number of sensors becomes large. This ob-
servation suggests that revealing the local estimates of sensors
8Fig. 2. The multi-sensor estimation set up.
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Fig. 3. The error probability of the optimal estimator of X in the privacy-
oblivious scenario as a function of the number of sensors.
to an untrusted user results in a high level of leakage of private
information.
We next numerically study the dependency of the output of
the optimal perfect privacy estimator on the private random
variable. Fig. 4 shows the empirical conditional probability of
X given the output of the optimal perfect privacy estimator
when the number of sensors is equal to 10. According to
this figure, under the perfect privacy estimator, the conditional
probability of X = 1 (X = 0) does not depend on the
estimated value of Y and is equal to the probability of the
event X = 1 (X = 0). This observation is in accordance
with the fact that, under the perfect privacy constraint, the
output of the estimator is independent of the private random
variable. Thus, an untrusted user is not able to infer the private
information using the output of the estimator.
Finally, in Fig. 5, we compare the performance of the
optimal perfect privacy estimator in recovering Y with that
of the privacy-oblivious estimation scenario. According to
this figure, the performance of the optimal perfect privacy
estimator in recovering the public random variable Y is close
to that of the optimal estimator of Y in the privacy-oblivious
scenario. Based on Fig. 3 and 4, the perfect privacy estimator
ensures that the estimate of Y does not contain any information
about X and its estimation reliability is close to the optimal
estimator in the privacy-oblivious scenario, in the considered
0 1
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Fig. 4. The empirical conditional probability of X = 0 (a) and X = 1 (b)
given Yˆ = y under the optimal perfect privacy estimator of Y . The number
of sensors is equal to 10.
set-up.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we studied the optimal privacy-aware esti-
mation of a public random variable when the sensors’ mea-
surements contain noisy information about the public random
variable as well as a private random variable. The optimal
estimation of the public random variable, under a binary
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Fig. 5. The error probability of estimating Y under the optimal perfect privacy
estimator and the optimal estimator of Y in the privacy-oblivious scenario with
the number of sensors.
loss function, with a constraint on the privacy level of the
private random variable was studied. The conditional discrete
entropy of the private random variable subject to the output
of estimator was considered as the privacy metric and it was
shown that the optimal estimator can be obtained by solving
(a possibly infinite dimensional) convex optimization problem.
It was shown that the optimal perfect privacy estimator can be
obtained by solving a convex optimization problem.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
We first write the average loss function as
E
[
L
(
Y, YˆP (Z)
)]
= E
[
1{Y 6=YˆP (Z)}
]
= Pr
(
Y 6= YˆP (Z)
)
= 1− Pr
(
Y = YˆP (Z)
)
Using the Bayes’ rule, Pr
(
Y = YˆP (Z)
)
can be written as
(11) where pZ (z) is the probability density function of Z
and (a) follows from the fact that, given Z = z, YˆP (Z) is
independent of Y .
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA B
Using the definition of the conditional entropy, the privacy
constraint can be written as (12). The probability mass func-
tions p
YˆP
(y) and p
YˆP
(y |X = xj ) can be expanded as
p
YˆP
(yi) = Pr
(
YˆP (Z) = yi
)
=
∫
Pr
(
YˆP (Z) = yi
∣∣∣Z = z) pZ (z) dz
=
∫
Pi (z) pZ (z)dz (13)
and
p
YˆP
(yi |X = xj )
= Pr
(
YˆP (Z) = yi
∣∣∣X = xj)
=
∫
Pr
(
YˆP (Z) = yi
∣∣∣X = xj , Z = z) pZ (z |X = xj ) dz
=
∫
Pr
(
YˆP (Z) = yi
∣∣∣Z = z) pZ (z |X = xj ) dz
=
∫
Pi (z) pZ (z |X = xj ) dz
respectively. Let P ′ (z) = [P ′i (z)]i denote a set of positive
functions defined on R with
∑
i P
′
i (z) = 1 for all z ∈ R.
Consider a new estimator of Y , denoted by YˆP˜ (Z), where
P˜ (z) is a convex combination of P (z) and P ′ (z), that is
P˜ (z) = [αPi (z) + (1− α)P
′
i (z)]i. Thus, we have
p
YˆP˜
(yi) = α
∫
Pi (z) pZ (z)dz + (1− α)
∫
P ′i (z) pZ (z)dz
= αp
YˆP
(yi) + (1− α) pYˆP ′
(yi) (14)
and,
p
YˆP˜
(yi |X = xj ) = α
∫
Pi (z) pZ (z |X = xj ) dz
+ (1− α)
∫
P ′i (z) pZ (z |X = xj ) dz
= αp
YˆP
(yi |X = xj )
+ (1− α) p
YˆP ′
(yi |X = xj ) (15)
where YˆP ′ (Z) is the estimator of Y based on
P ′ (z). Using the convexity of KL divergence [25],
D
[
p
YˆP˜
(y |X = xj )
∥∥∥pYˆP˜ (y)
]
can be upper bounded as
(16), for j = {1, · · · , n}. which implies that the privacy
constraint is convex in P (z).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Note that the mutual information between X and YˆP (Z)
can be expanded as (17). Using (17), the Lagrangian of the
optimization problem (6) can be written as (18) where λ is
the vector of Lagrange multipliers associated with the equality
constraints, µ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the
privacy constraint and P = {Pij}ij .
The partial derivative of Lagrangian with respect to Phk can
be written as where (a) follows from (20).
Note that the optimization problem (6) is a convex optimiza-
tion problem and it is straightforward to show that the Slater’s
condition holds for this problem. Thus, using the necessary and
sufficient Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, we have
∂L (P ,λ, µ)
∂Phk
|P ⋆,λ⋆,µ⋆


= 0 if 0 < P ⋆hk < 1
≤ 0 if P ⋆hk = 0
≥ 0 if P ⋆hk = 1
10
Pr
(
Y = YˆP (Z)
)
=
∫
Pr
(
Y = YˆP (Z)
∣∣∣Z = z) pZ (z)dz
=
∫ ∑
i
Pr
(
Y = YˆP (Z) , Y = yi
∣∣∣Z = z) pZ (z) dz
=
∫ ∑
i
Pr
(
Y = YˆP (Z)
∣∣∣Z = z, Y = yi)Pr (Y = yi|Z = z) pZ (z) dz
=
∫ ∑
i
Pr
(
YˆP (Z) = yi
∣∣∣Z = z, Y = yi)Pr (Y = yi|Z = z) pZ (z)dz
(a)
=
∫ ∑
i
Pr
(
YˆP (Z) = yi
∣∣∣Z = z)Pr (Y = yi|Z = z) pZ (z)dz
=
∑
i
∫
Pi (z)Pr (Y = yi|Z = z) pZ (z)dz (11)
H
[
X
∣∣∣YˆP (Z)] = H [X ]− I [X ; YˆP (Z)]
= H [X ]−
∑
j
Pr (X = xj)D
[
p
YˆP
(y |X = xj )
∥∥∥pYˆP (y)
]
(12)
D
[
p
YˆP˜
(y |X = xj )
∥∥∥pYˆP˜ (y)
]
= D
[
αp
YˆP
(y |X = xj ) + (1− α) pYˆP ′ (y |X = xj )
∥∥∥αpYˆP (y) + (1− α) pYˆP ′ (y)
]
≤ αD
[
p
YˆP
(y |X = xj )
∥∥∥αpYˆP (y)
]
+ (1− α)D
[
p
YˆP ′
(y |X = xj )
∥∥∥pYˆP ′ (y)
]
(16)
I
[
X ; YˆP (Z)
]
=
∑
j
Pr (X = xj)D
[
p
YˆP
(y |X = xj )
∥∥∥pYˆP (y)
]
=
∑
j
Pr (X = xj)
∑
i
(∑
l
PilPr (Z ∈ Bl|X = xj)
)
log
∑
l PilPr (Z ∈ Bl|X = xj)∑
l PilPr (Z ∈ Bl)
(17)
where P ⋆ is the optimal solution, and λ⋆ and µ⋆ are the dual
optimal variables.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
To satisfy the perfect privacy condition, we need to have
Pr
(
Yˆ (Z) = yi, X = xj
)
= Pr
(
Yˆ (Z) = yi
)
Pr (X = xj)∀i, j
Note that Pr
(
Yˆ (Z) = yi, X = xj
)
and Pr
(
Yˆ (Z) = yi
)
can
be expanded as
Pr
(
X = xj , Yˆ (Z) = yi
)
=
∑
l
Pr
(
X = xj , Yˆ (Z) = yi, Z ∈ Bl
)
= Pr (X = xj)
∑
l
Pr
(
Yˆ (Z) = yi
∣∣∣Z ∈ Bl)Pr (Z ∈ Bl|X = xj)
= Pr (X = xj)
∑
l
PilPr (Z ∈ Bl|X = xj)
and
Pr
(
Yˆ (Z) = yi
)
=
∑
l
Pr
(
Yˆ (Z) = yi, Z ∈ Bl
)
=
∑
l
Pr
(
Yˆ (Z) = yi
∣∣∣Z ∈ Bl)Pr (Z ∈ Bl)
=
∑
l
PilPr (Z ∈ Bl)
Thus, for Pr (X = xj) 6= 0, the perfect privacy requirement
can be expressed as∑
l
Pil (Pr (Z ∈ Bl|X = xj)− Pr (Z ∈ Bl)) = 0 ∀i, j
For a given i, the condition above can be expressed as
ΦP i = 0 (21)
which implies that P i ∈ Null (Φ).
11
L (P ,λ, µ) =
m∑
i=1
N∑
l=1
PilPr (Z ∈ Bl|Y = yi)Pr (Y = yi)
− µ
∑
j
Pr (X = xj)
∑
i
(∑
l
PilPr (Z ∈ Bl|X = xj)
)
log
∑
l PilPr (Z ∈ Bl|X = xj)∑
l PilPr (Z ∈ Bl)
+
∑
l
λl
(∑
i
Pil − 1
)
(18)
∂L (P ,λ, µ)
∂Phk
= Pr (Z ∈ Bk|Y = yh)Pr (Y = yh) + λk
− µ
∑
j
Pr (X = xj)
[
Pr (Z ∈ Bk|X = xj) log
∑
l PhlPr (Z ∈ Bl|X = xj)∑
l PhlPr (Z ∈ Bl)
−
(∑
l
PhlPr (Z ∈ Bl|X = xj)
)(
Pr (Z ∈ Bk|X = xj)∑
l PhlPr (Z ∈ Bl|X = xj)
−
Pr (Z ∈ Bk)∑
l PhlPr (Z ∈ Bl)
)]
(a)
= Pr (Z ∈ Bk|Y = yh)Pr (Y = yh) + λk
− µ
∑
j
Pr (X = xj)
[
Pr (Z ∈ Bk|X = xj) log
∑
l PhlPr (Z ∈ Bl|X = xj)∑
l PhlPr (Z ∈ Bl)
]
(19)
∑
j
Pr (X = xj)
(∑
l
PhlPr (Z ∈ Bl|X = xj)
)(
Pr (Z ∈ Bk|X = xj)∑
l PhlPr (Z ∈ Bl|X = xj)
−
Pr (Z ∈ Bk)∑
l PhlPr (Z ∈ Bl)
)
= 0 (20)
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
Let P = P1×· · ·×PN denote the joint probability simplex
corresponding to the randomization probabilities of bins, i.e.,
(P1l, · · · , Pml)
⊤
∈ Pl for all l ∈ {1, · · · , N}. We show that
there are infinity many points in P which satisfy the perfect
privacy condition if N > n.
Note that for N > n, the null space of Φ is non-empty. Pick
a set of positive real numbers {λi}
m
i=1 where 0 < λi < 1 for
all i and
∑
i λi = 1. Let (λ1, · · · , λm)
⊤
be the randomization
probability of bin l for all 1 ≤ l ≤ N , i.e., Pil = λi for all
i, l. Thus, we have P i = (λi, · · · , λi). Note that P i belongs
to Null (Φ) as the sum of the elements in each row of Φ is
equal to zero.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF LEMMA 6
Pick N > n and {Bi ⊂ R}
N
i=1 where Bis are arbitrary
discretization bins. According to Lemma 5, the feasible set of
the optimization problem (9) is non-empty. Let
{
P¯l
}
l
denote
a point in the feasible set of (9) where P¯l = (P1l, · · · , Pml)
⊤
denotes the randomization probabilities corresponding to the
bin l. Now, we construct {Pi (z)}i as follows. For z ∈ Bl,
let Pi(z) = Pil for all i. Thus, any feasible solution of (9)
corresponds to a piecewise constant solution for (10) which
satisfies the privacy constraint.
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